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Aid for the Medically Indigent
Jacob Meerman* and Millard Long**
The authors here discuss the ability of low income groups to pur-
chase needed medical care and consider the various alternatives to
governmental action. Professors Meerman and Long review some of the
proposals made in Congress to remedy the problem, and then offer
suggested legislation which would not only give benefits to the aged,
but to the indigent as well.
I. INWhODUMCION'
In the last 100 years technological change has caused a revolution
in medical practice. Doctors, practicing specialties which did not
exist a century ago, administer treatments with drugs and equipment
only recently invented. The radiologist with his cobalt bomb and
the heart surgeon with his pump-oxygenator are able to treat ailments
incurable as recently as fifteen years ago. The hospital, too, has
changed from little more than a hotel for the sick into an institution
at the core of modem medical practice.
The results have been spectacular-the so-called public health
diseases have been largely eliminated by vaccination and other con-
trols; maternal and infant deaths have been drastically reduced; and
the life expectancy of the newborn baby has increased from under 50
years at the turn of the century to more than 70 today.
On the other hand, modem medicine is very expensive; it takes ten
years after college to train the heart surgeon, and many millions to
construct a modem hospital. True, the average man is far more apt
to benefit from a sojourn in a hospital today than fifty years ago, but
his bill will be many times what it was in 1910. The technological
developments that have resulted in enhanced health and longer life
expectancy have been accompanied by rising costs.
Simultaneous with these developments has been the growth of the
conviction among the public that no one should be denied medical
care because of inability to pay-or go bankrupt in the process. Al-
though in recent years attention has been focused mainly on the aged,
a group with generally low incomes and high rates of sickness, the
provision of medical care for the indigent from all groups is widely
recognized as a pressing problem.
*Assistant Professor of Economics, Washington State University.
"*Assistant Professor of Economics and Business Administration, Vanderbilt Uni-
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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
In the following paper we discuss the ability of low income groups
to purchase needed care, consider the private alternatives to govern-
ment action, find these deficient, and hence review various proposals
made to the Congress. Finally, we examine a proposal which, while
originally propounded in the early Fifties, has received little attention
in the recent debates. To the authors, it would seem the best ap-
proach to care for the indigent.
II. TAE PROBLEM OF MEDICAL INDIGENCE
It is not correct to suppose that everyone over 65 is medically
indigent or even that the aged are the only ones in need of assistance
with their health bills. However, since they do form the age group
in which medical requirements are greatest and income lowest, it is
understandable that as a category they should have received a major
share of the attention given to the problem in recent years. As a
group they require twice the care of the rest of the population-e.g.,
the aged used 1785.4 days of short term care per 1000 persons in
1957-58, as compared with 851.2 days per 1000 consumed by the
country in general.2 Furthermore, their incomes are lower, an average
per person over 65 of $950 against $2,225 per capita for the entire
United States.3 Nor is the argument correct that the aged can use
assets rather than income to pay their medical bills. While it is true
that they do have some capital, this is almost always tied up in a
home, with financial assets usually being negligible.4 Complicating
the problem is the fact that most of the aged do not carry health
insurance; in 1959, 46 per cent carried hospital insurance, 37 per cent
had surgical coverage, and only 10 per cent were covered for phy-
sician's visits. 5 The evidence indicates, moreover, that even with
insurance, benefits are often inadequate to meet the needs of this
group.
The problem, however, is not basically one of being old, but of
having large medical bills and little income, facts often, but not
exclusively, associated with those over 65. For many with low in-
comes, medical outlays are a heavy burden. In 1958, families with
incomes under $2,000 spent 13 per cent of their aggregate income on
health services, while those in the $7,500 and over category spent
2. U.S. PUBLIc HEALTH SERVICE, HEALTH STATISTICS FROM THE U.S. NATIONAL
HEALTH SURVEY, SERIEs B-7 at 7' (Dec. 1958).
3. EcooNMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1962 at 226-27 (1962); Epstein, Sources and
Sizes of Money Income of the Aged, in 25 Social Security Bull., Jan. 1962, p. 16.
4. Medical Care Costs of Aged OASI Beneficiaries: Highlights from Preliminary
Data, 1957 Survey, in 22 Social Security Bull., Apr. 1950, p. 3.
5. U.S. PuBmIc HEALTH SERviCE, HEALTH STATISTICS FROM THE U.S. NATIONAL
HEALTH SURVEY: INTERIm REPORT ON HEALTH INSURANCE 2 (1960).
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only 3.9 per cent.6 Moreover, it is important to separate the individ-
ual from the average; high costs are not spread evenly over a given
group but are concentrated among a few unfortunates. For the year
between June 1957 and June 1958, 46 per cent of those over 65 had
total outlays on medical services under $50, while 15 per cent had
expenditures of $300 or more.7 Comparable figures for the under
$2,000 income group show the same situation. In short, only a small
minority of the population have such high expenditures that they re-
quire assistance. To state it differently, while most families had
modest expenditures, 6 per cent spent more than 20 per cent of their
income on health services. 8 This is the group in need of assistance.
Many are aged, but some are not; most are poor, but most of the
poor do not require aid; and occasionally there is an individual in
the upper income brackets whose medical bills are so extraordinary
that he too is in need of financial help.
III. METHODS OF BEL]EF
The major cause of medical indigence is poverty. In 1959, 14 per
cent of American families had incomes less than $2,000; another 21
per cent had incomes between $2,000 and $4,000.9 With large medical
bills, either group will suffer substantial privation in paying them.
Given that a substantial redistribution of wealth is not a feasible
method of relief, there remain three alternatives: charity, insurance,
and government assistance.
A. CHAR=T
In 1959, charities contributed about $700 million in cash for pur-
chase of medical care, amounting to about 2 per cent of total medi-
cal expenditures. 10 To pay the bills of the medically indigent would
require at least a tripling of these cash grants, an unlikely possibility.
Considerably larger benefits are received by needy patients in the
form of services free or at reduced costs from doctors and hospitals.
The contributions of private physicians, often at a sacrifice to them-
selves, are far from negligible, and it has been suggested that medical
indigence might be eliminated by further effort in this direction.
Doctor's fees, however, account for less than one third of total medical
outlays so that even with maximum contributions the problem would
6. Anderson, Collette & Feldman, Family Expenditure Patterns for Personal Health
Services, in 14 HEALTH INFORMTION FOUNDATION RESEAECH SERIES 8 (1958).
7. Id. at 61.
8. id. at 23.
9. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 113 (1961).
10. Merriam, Social Welfare Expenditures, 1958-59, in 23 Social Security Bull., Nov.
1960, Table 5, p. 43.
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remain largely unsolved. Nor is free hospital care an equitable
arrangement for providing assistance to the indigent. To remain
solvent, hospitals have to recoup the costs of services donated to the
poor by higher charges to paying patients. Hence, the solvent
patient has to bear the costs not only of his own sickness, but those
of others as well. This is inequitable since the paying patient is al-
ready burdened with sickness, hospital expenses, and often a tem-
porary loss of income.
B. INsuRANcE
Many have argued that the problem can be solved through private
insurance, stressing the rapid growth in the insured from 10 per
cent of the population in 1941 to 76 per cent in 1961. Even that
hard to insure group, the aged, have participated in this expansion.
Today ownership of insurance is widespread, but the benefits are
not comprehensive: with over three-quarters of the population
covered, insurance pays less than a quarter of the total medical bills."
Those with high medical charges fall into two categories, i.e., the
aged and those with recognized ailments, and the nominally good
risks who have unexpectedly large medical bills in a particular year.
The problems of the latter can be handled by private insurance, but
whether those of the former can is doubtful. Insurance premiums
must cover benefits plus administrative costs, and where expenditures
are likely to be large, so must be the premiums. Policies providing
comprehensive benefits for the poor risk group would be very ex-
pensive, in fact, beyond the means of many in the lower income
brackets.
There are two basic types of health insurance ratings: experience
and community. The former calculates premiums on the probability
that the individual will need services. With the latter, the premiums
are uniform over the entire insured population. Community ratings
spread the cost of the poor risk group among the insured; with ex-
perience ratings the individual's premiums are in line with his own
risk. The Blue Cross-Blue Shield plans usually rely on the com-
munity approach and private firms on the other. Using experience
ratings, the private companies offer preferred risk groups more attrac-
tive policies. Hence, better risks are continually leaving the Blue
plans, forcing the latter to raise rates to cover the higher per capita
charges of the poor risks. To maintain their competitive position, the
Blue plans have in some instances adopted experience rating.
The costs of the bad risk group could be spread by community
rating. But as mentioned above, this type of insurance finds it hard
to compete with the experience-rated plans. Since the better risks
11. Id. at 43.
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usually leave community plans, the latter tend to evolve into little
more than experience-rated plans for the poor risk group. Legislation
outlawing experience ratings would be necessary to keep community
ratings general in their coverage. Were this done poor risks could be
insured at relatively low cost.
However, it is not clear that community ratings are a desirable
solution to the problem. They force individuals to bear the burden
of the medically indigent in proportion to the amount of insurance
held. This approach is equivalent to a tax, and taxes that do not
increase with people's ability to pay are not equitable.
To solve the problem of the medically indigent, private insurance
must provide adequate benefits at a price that all can afford. Com-
munity ratings which do reduce the burden borne by the poor risk
group are poor competitors with the experience-rated plans, and do
not distribute the costs in an equitable manner. Experience ratings
are both feasible and just, but only if government assistance is given
to the indigent in meeting their premiums.
C. GoVNMEr
Since charity and private insurance cannot solve the problem of
the inadequately cared for and financially burdened, we are left with
the third alternative-government. Germane here is the current role
of government in caring for the medically indigent. What proportion
of this group is already covered by some government program?
Among government programs, those providing preventive medical
services are of major importance. The United States Public Health
Service and the local and state public health units provide services
of this type through controlling contagious diseases, supervising
sanitation in restaurants, and so forth. The "well-baby-care" services
provided by public health units also fall into this category as well as
the school health programs.
A second function largely taken over by government is care of the
chronically ill. Over 80 per cent of the insane are in state hospitals.
In fact, most state hospitals either provide services to the insane,
those with tuberculosis or "other special health problems." 2 The
payments of the federal government to the blind and the crippled are
also in this category.
However, government programs also cover acute and chronic
patients. Merchant seamen and members of the armed forces receive
medical care at government expense; this is also true of Indians on
the reservation and Eskimos. The Veterans' Administration provides
hospital care for veterans with service connected disabilities as well as
for nonservice connected disabilities when the veteran cannot pay for




State workmen's compensation laws currently cover about 80 per
cent of those employed. 14 These laws require that employers pay for
medical care made necessary by work injuries as well as make pay-
ments for extended time periods when chronic disability results.
Adding the relevant programs together, as in Table 1, we find that
most of the public remains responsible for its own medical bills. The
number covered is vastly overestimated since most veterans do not
attempt to receive free medical care from the government. Hence,
less than a quarter of the United States population is not responsible
for paying its own medical bills. The problem of medical indigence




Since the 1930's, well over a hundred bills have been introduced
in the Congress concerning some aspect of health insurance. Rather
than attempt a detailed description of these various proposals, we will
outline some of the major approaches. 15
Unlike the current suggestion to limit assistance to the aged, many
of the earlier programs aimed at financing the medical care of the
nation, or at least of the entire low-income group. Perhaps the best
remembered are a series of bills proposed by Senator Murray and
Congressman Dingell. Their original bill, also sponsored by Senator
Wagner, was introduced in Congress in 1943.16 It provided for com-
pulsory coverage of nearly all employees and their dependents; and
proposed benefits included almost all physicians', dental, and home
nursing services; hospital services for periods up to 60 days per
beneficiary per year; prescribed auxiliary services; appliances; and
expensive drugs.
The bill did not specify the source of needed federal revenues.
However, it is clear that payroll taxation would have been used. The
bill provided an annual appropriation equal to a maximum of 3, per
cent of wages up to $4,800 per year per insured employee. With the
exception of the original bill, all of the 22 bills submitted in the
13. Id. at 383, 405.
14. U.S. Dep't of Labor, BUREAu OF LABOR STANDARDS, BULL. 161, STATE WORK-
mEN'S CoMENSATION LAWS 2 (1961).
15. A detailed discussion of such proposals is contained in the U.S. DEP'T OF
HFAITI, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SEcuR=TY ADMINISTnATION DIVISION OF
PROGRAM RESEARCH, MAJOR LEGISLATIVE PROPosALs FOR FINANCING PERSONAL HEALTH
SERVICES. FOR =I AGED, 1939-1961 (1962) [hereinafter cited as MAJOR LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSALS].
16. S. 1161, H.R. 2861, 78th Cong., Ist Sess. (1943).
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Table 1
GROUPS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR MEETING THEIR
MEDICAL CARE PAYMENTS IN 1960
Group Number in Thousands
Institutional Population ................... 1,897
Indians ................................ 300
Merchant Seamen ........................ 50
Veterans ............................... 20,197
Armed Forces ........................... 2,514
Imputed Number Covered Under Workmen's
Compensationa ........................ 21,245
TOTAL ................................ 46,203
U. S. Population ......................... 178,997
a The imputed number covered under workmen's compensation was derived by
taking 80% of the average total number employed of 66.39 million during 1960. This
overestimates those covered by workmen's compensation. However, such legislation
covers solely on-the-job injuries, and, since people spend no more than 40% of their
waking hours on the job, the 80% of the 66.39 million was reduced to 40% or 21.25.
The resulting estimate is clearly an upper limit.
Sources: STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrED STATES, 1962, passim. ECONOMic RE-
PORT OF THE PREsmENT 1962 at 230.
Congress embodying this proposal saw the federal government as
providing funds to the states on the basis of population and varying
costs of services. Actual disposition of the funds was left to the states
acting in accordance with the law.17
Another approach is typified by Senator Hunt's bill, introduced in
1950.18 He advised the establishment of a national health insurance
system with voluntary participation and restricted to families with
incomes less than $5,000.per year. Those joining were to pay a
premium into a personal health insurance account in the United
States Treasury. Proposed benefits were medical, surgical, and dental
services; home nursing care; hospital care and related services up to
60 days per person per year; auxiliary services such as laboratory
tests, X-ray diagnosis or therapy, optometrists' services, appliances,
expensive drugs, and so forth.19 "Congress was authorized to appro-
priate additional money to the account when needed to carry out the
program."2 0
Many programs have relied upon a combination of state administra-
tion and federal financing in whole or in part. Typical of these are
17. BrawsTum, HEALTH INSURANCE AND RELATED PROPOSALS FOR FINANCING PER-
SONAL HEALTH SERVIcES 26 (1958).
18. S. 2940, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
19. BREwSTER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 20.
20. MAJOR LEGISLATIvE PROPOSALS 15.
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the Capper and Taft proposals. The Capper bills of 1939-41 were
designed to foster state programs of medical care for lower income
workers, enrollment being compulsory. Those covered were to be
determined by the individual states. Workers were to contribute to
the program according to their income, with federal assistance for
those with lower earnings. The Taft bills of 1946-49 included a
scheme of matching federal grants for state operated programs. The
Taft proposals have certain similarities with the current Kerr-Mills
Act, for not only were matching grants proposed, but participation
was to be limited to individuals and families unable "to pay the whole
cost of needed medical and dental services," in short, the medically
indigent. The states we're free to choose a variety of ways of pro-
viding and paying for services. Moreover, an additional provision of
the bill called for "surveys of existing medical, hospital, and dental
services for formulation "in detail' of a five-year plan for extending
such services to persons unable to pay."2 1
Not until the 1950's did proposed legislation concentrate on the
aged. The first bill to provide hospitalization benefits for the
beneficiaries under title II of the Social Security Act was introduced
in Congress in 1952. 2 As its major benefit it provided 60 days of short
term general hospital care, including those services, drugs and sup-
plies which a hospital usually furnished its patients. Financing would
have been through increased Social Security rates for employees,
employers, and the self employed. This bill would have used the
states as agents of the federal government in paying the hospitals
for services rendered.
In recent years the proposals have been mainly of two types; state
administration of programs supported by matching grants from the
federal government have competed for favor with benefit schemes
to be administered through the Social Security system and financed
by increased payroll taxes. The current Administration's bill can be
considered the most recent member of this latter genre and is dis-
cussed in detail below.
Some bills were designed to foster the growth of private insurance,
often by subsidizing companies insuring either poor risks or poor
people, or both. The Hill-Aiken Bills,2 for example, provided volun-
tary health insurance for persons unable to pay part or all of the
usual premium. Benefits consisted of 60 days of hospital care per
insuree annually; surgical, obstetrical, and medical services in the
hospital; and diagnostic and outpatient services in hospitals or
21. MAjoR LEG sLATrvE PtoPosAmS 20.
22. S. 3001, H.R. 7484, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) (Murray & Dingell).
23. S. 1456, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); S. 2171, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); S.
93, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
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diagnostic clinics. 24 Under this program state agencies were to collect
that part of the premium the poor could afford to pay and then
supplement the funds so that the insurance company would receive
a full premium for each insuree. The federal government was to
share one-third to three-fourths of the state's costs depending upon
the state's financial ability.
The Smathers proposal of 196025 provided a direct subsidy to any
insurance company in the amount of losses suffered on "approved
policies." The approved policies were to provide a minimum of 60
days of hospitalization, 120 days of nursing home care, and $50 worth
of drugs per year. Maximum cost for the policy was set at $72 per
year. The loss subsidies under this program would have been sub-
stantial. There have also been a number of schemes designed pri-
marily to encourage expansion of private insurance by "waiving the
antitrust laws so as to permit insurance carriers to pool their re-
sources in developing policies and methods for extending insurance
to substandard health risks
2 6
In the last session of Congress, well over three dozen bills concern-
ing care for the medically indigent were introduced. Again, it is
possible to consider only the major proposals. To assist in evaluating
these bills we have developed a set of four criteria.
B. Cmrrmu.
The first criterion is the number of the needy the program would
cover. We argue that not only the aged require assistance; need is
a question of size of medical bills relative to income, not one of age.
Hence, restricting coverage to those over 65 is undesirable. A good
program would recognize and grant assistance to the medically indi-
gent regardless of age or other characteristics.
The second measure is the extent of benefits. These should not be
limited by either type or amount. Aid should be comprehensive,
including all the major categories of medical service: doctors, hos-
pitals and nursing homes, drugs, and appliances. Excluding the
physician, for example, as the Administration's plan would do, would
leave unprotected those with large doctor bills and, at the same time,
would encourage a wasteful use of hospitals, as people attempted to
substitute the insured type of service for the uninsured. Nor should
there be an overall quantity limitation on benefits, e.g., 90 days of
hospital care. Costs of the program should be restricted by use of
initial deductions and co-insurance rather than by an upper limit on
benefits. The argument against deductions (provision for the re-
24. BamvsTER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 10.
25. S. 3646, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
26. MAJOR LEGISLATIVE PRoposAS 25.
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cipient to pay the first of so many dollars of costs) and co-insurance
(provision for the recipient to pay a certain fraction of the costs) is
that some may not be able to afford even a partial contribution to
their care. But restricting length of coverage would be far more
burdensome to the sick; patients are even less able to pay after their
illness has run for an extended period. If the program provides for
90 days of hospitalization and the individual requires 180 days of
care, he will be left in an untenable position.
The rationale behind government assistance should be to provide
care beyond what the individual can himself afford. Consequently,
public funds should be spent on the large bills of the few, not the
smaller bills of the many. If the plan is to pay only part of the
patient's expenditures, government should assist with the cost of the
last rather than the first unit of care. The justification for co-insur-
ance is partly that it would reduce the public outlay and, more
importantly, that it would prevent a wasteful use of medical resources
by requiring the patient to assume part of the costs.
Third, the program should be equitably financed. We have argued
that certain solutions-such as passing the charges of the non-paying
to the paying hospital patient-are inequitable. The costs of a good
program should be distributed according to ability to pay; that is,
the individual's contribution expressed as a per cent of his income
should rise with increasing wealth.
Fourth, the administrative costs of the plan adopted should be
reasonable. As much of the funds as possible should be used to pay
medical bills; overhead should be minimized.
C. TAE ADMINISTRATION BILL
This proposa 27 which follows the suggestions of former Representa-
tive Aime Forand, provides payment for hospitals, skilled nursing
homes, and home health services for those 65 and over receiving
Social Security benefits. In the form presented to the last Congress,
the bill provides up to 90 days of in-patient hospitalization in semi-
private accommodations subject to a deductible provision of $10 per
day for each of the first 9 days of care; up to 180 days of skilled
nursing home service for those needing further care after hospitaliza-
tion; home health services up to a maximum of 240 visits; and hos-
pital outpatient diagnostic studies subject to a deduction of $20 for
each complete study.2
One argument against this bill is that it would impose restraints
27. S. 909, H.R. 4222, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) (Anderson & King).
28. The maximum combined hospital and home nursing services would be 150 units
of service per year. A "unit" would be either one day of hospital service or t:vo days
of nursing home service.
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on the necessarily free doctor-patient relationship. Centralized ad-
ministration, it is argued, is too bureaucratic, and too distant to be
responsive to local needs. We are unconvinced that this approach
would bring the "intervention of Washington in the doctor-patient
relationship." The Government has always been discreet in its
widespread contacts with the medical profession. Moreover, the bill
lays a specific prohibition against interference by a federal official
with the practice of medicine or in the selection, tenure, or compen-
sation of any provider of services, or even against the exercise of any
supervision or control over the latter. As the payer of bills, the Gov-
ernment would have the right to see that its money was well spent,
just as the Blue Cross-Blue Shield and the private insurance com-
panies have such rights today; but we doubt that this would interfere
with the best medical practices.
With regard to the fourth criterion set out above, the program
would appear acceptable-the administrative costs of Social Security
have not been exceptionally high, and this extension would not add
unduly to costs.
As for the other criteria, the proposal is not acceptable. As the
plan restricts participation to the aged, it will not assist all those whose
medical bills are high relative to their incomes. Excluded from pro-
tection are all those under 65, as well as those over 65 who are not
covered by Social Security. There are many individuals in both
excluded groups who are medically indigent; on the other hand, in a
given year the vast majority, perhaps 80 per cent of those on Social
Security, have financial resources sufficient to meet their outlays.
29
This bill would assist a large number with low priorities, while leaving
unaided many whose needs are acute.
The proposal also falls short on the second criterion-comprehensive
benefits. There is both a restriction on the type of service insured and
on maximum benefits. Not covered are doctors' fees, private-duty
nursing, and drugs provided outside of hospitals or nursing homes.
These excluded items comprise roughly two-fifths of all medical out-
lays. 30 The individual needing help is the one with large expenses
and few financial resources. His need is as great whether the bill
is from a doctor or a hospital, and increases after he has been in a
hospital for an extended period. Limiting benefits will cause hardship
for many individuals. To save money, let coverage be restricted to
those with the highest priorities; to promote efficient use of resources
let co-insurance and additional deductions be introduced. In its
present form the Administration bill can only result in a wasteful
29. Medical Care Costs of Aged OASI Beneficiaries: Highlights from Preliminary
Data, 1957 Survey, in 22 Social Security Bull., Apr. 1959, p. 3.




The third criterion was that of equitable financing. The proposed
plan would finance benefits by an increased payroll tax. The Adminis-
tration estimated the costs of the program at $1.06 billion for a full
year's operation in 196231 and would raise the funds by increasing
OASDI- deductions by 0.25 per cent for both employees and em-
ployers and by 0.375 per cent for the self-employed. In addition, the
tax base would be raised from the first $4,800 of wages to the first
$5,200.
Whether one regards Social Security deductions as compulsory
insurance premiums or a tax makes little difference. Their immediate
effect is to increase the purchasing power of the aged by reducing
that of the employed. Musgrave estimated that in 1954 social security
contributions came to about 4 per cent of income for those with in-
come under $5000. The contribution then gradually fell to 1 per
cent for those with incomes over $10,000.- Changes in the act since
1958 have increased both these percentages and the differential.
Because workers with lower incomes pay a higher fraction of their
salaries into Social Security, the burden on the employed of this
assistance program is regressive. It would be more equitable to have
the costs of the program distributed so that they increased with in-
come.
Our criticism of the Administration bill can be summed up as
follows: (1) it would cover many of those who do not need assistance,
but more importantly, it would leave unprotected many who do; (2)
it would provide the wrong type of benefits, paying the first dollar of
medical expenditure rather than the last and restricting the kinds of
services insured; (3) it would distribute the costs in a regressive
rather than a progressive manner. Thus, even if this bill were passed,
much of the problem would remain unsolved.
During the Second Session of the 87th Congress at least three bills
were submitted differing from the King-Anderson Bill solely in minor
details as concerns benefits and eligibility requirements. We shall not
discuss these because the objections to them are the same as those
raised with regard to King-Anderson.
D. THE Bow BiuL
In the 87th Congress, Representative Bow sponsored a bill
providing those 65 and over with a tax credit or certificate of
31. Our own analysis shows this figure to be at least one-third too low.
32. Old Age and Survivors Disability Insurance.
33. Musgrave, The Incidence of the Tax Structure and Its Effects on Consumption, in
FEDERAL TAX PoucYr FOR EcoNolNc Gno-WT- AND STABILrTY 98 (Papers Submitted by
Panelists Appearing Before the Subcommittee on Tax Policy, Joint Committtee on the
Economic Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., Nov. 9, 1955).
34. H.R. 10755, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
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up to $125 per year for purchasing one of two types of guaranteed
renewable health insurance policies. Under one option minimum
benefits were to include hospital insurance of $12 per day up to
$1,080 in a year; ancillary hospital charges of $120 per year; con-
valescent hospital room and board of $6 a day up to $186 a year
(following release from a general hospital); and finally compensation
for surgery according to a fee schedule up to $300 in a year. The
second option was to be a policy with deductions and co-insurance
features; either a maximum deduction of $100 per year and a minimum
life-time value of not less than $5,000, or a plan with a maximum
deductible of $200 per year and a lifetime value of not less than
$10,000. The individual was to be responsible for not more than 25
per cent as co-insurance. Policies of this latter type would provide
comprehensive benefits including physicians' and nurses' fees, drugs,
and other requirements. The plan was to be administered by the
Treasury Department and financed out of general tax revenues.
Tax credit schemes have already proved themselves administratively
feasible and inexpensive. Furthermore, financing through general tax
revenues is considerably more equitable than increasing the regressive
payroll tax on which Social Security is based. Musgrave's study of
1954 showed that the distribution of federal taxes is progressive, be-
ginning with a 12 per cent rate for those with incomes under $2000
and rising to 33 per cent for those with incomes over $10,000.
35
As to the question of numbers covered, the bill appears deficient.
Those under 65, even if medically indigent, are excluded. Moreover,
many of the poor risks over 65, precisely those with the greatest need
for health insurance would find that they cannot afford adequate
insurance even with the $125 per year credit. Further, benefits pro-
vided under the first option are inadequate. The current average cost
of a day of care in a general short-term hospital exceeds $33 and
surgical fees are often considerably in excess of $300. In the event
of serious illness many would still find themselves unable to pay for
adequate care. While less than ideal, the second option has ad-
vantages over most other proposals. Although still excluding many
who require assistance and including many who do not, it would
provide for those insured adequate protection when most needed-
in the case of medical catastrophe.
E. Tim JAvrrs PROPosALs
The Javits Bill has changed considerably since it was first in-
troduced in the 86th Congress. In its original form36 a system of
matching grants from the federal government to the states was
35. Musgrave, supra note 33, at 98.
36. S. 3350, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
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envisaged. These, together with contributions from the aged them-
selves, were to be used to purchase approved health insurance policies.
The aged insuree was to be given a choice between service and
indemnity benefits. In current form 37 this bill has little in common
with earlier versions. Financing is to be through increased Social
Security taxes as in the King-Anderson Bill. Eligible would be every-
one over 72 and those over 65 who either were receiving Social
Security benefits or had personal incomes under $3000 for individuals
or $4,500 for couples. Because of broader coverage than the Adminis-
tration bill, additional financing from general tax revenues would be
required. Eligible individuals may choose one of three options. The
first provides 21 days of hospital care per year or, as an alternative,
skilled nursing home services at the rate of three days of the latter for
one hospital day; in addition, it would provide 12 days of physicians'
services, up to $100 of ambulatory, diagnostic, laboratory, or X-ray
services and 24 days of organized home health care services.
In the second option the individual must pay the first $125 plus 20
per cent of additional charges. But the federal government would
pay 80 per cent of the costs on a maximum of 120 days hospital
care, surgical services provided in a hospital, skilled nursing home
services after transfer from a hospital, and organized home health care
services. The final option provides for federal payment to an in-
surance carrier of premiums up to $100 per year on a renewable
private health insurance policy that provides benefits which the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare determines to be of
value not less than the value of benefits under the other two options.
Because of the "tripartite" nature of this bill it is difficult to evalu-
ate. It is an improvement over the Administration bill in that it
would include all the aged. Nevertheless, the medically indigent
under 65 are still excluded. Financing would be primarily through
the Social Security mechanism, a method we consider undesirable
because it falls so heavily on lower income groups. As to benefits,
the second option appears more attractive than the first, even though
benefits are far from comprehensive. While covering initial expendi-
tures, the first plan would leave the patient in dire straits in event of
a serious illness. The third option cannot be evaluated without
knowledge of how it would work.38
37. S. 2664, as amended May 2, 1962, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
38. As of July, 1962, Senator Javits, with Senator Clinton Anderson, sponsored a
"bipartisan compromise" bill. S. 3565, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). Attached as a
rider to a welfare bill passed by the House, the compromise differs from the
Anderson-King Bill in that those aged not eligible for OASDI benefits are brought in.
Their costs are to be covered by general revenue funds. In addition, an option is to
be provided in the form of allowing the aged a choice between Social Security
benefits and enrollment in private health plans. See N. Y. Times, July 8, 1962,
§ 4, p. E9.
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F. Tim KERR-MiLLs Acr
The Kerr-Mills Bill was the program which was accepted as a
compromise by the 86th Congress and enacted into law.39 The federal
government agreed to assist the states in paying the costs of persons
over 65, who, while not on public assistance, had financial resources
insufficient to meet their medical bills. It was left to each state to
decide on eligibility and on the type and quantity of services to be
insured, but it was specified that benefits could not be greater than
those provided through the public assistance program. To encourage
action in both spheres, the act liberalized the federal government's
contribution to the state's medical program for those on assistance.
Washington's share of the costs range from 50 to 80 per cent de-
pending upon the state's per capita income.
We approve the basic notion of this act; those who cannot pay their
medical bills should have first priority on government assistance.
We also think it right that the federal law did not specify an income
limitation or establish quantitative or qualitative restrictions on bene-
fits. However, the state legislatures are responsible for determining
both eligibility and range of benefits and many have restricted these
in ways which do not meet our criteria for a good program. In
October, 1961, 21 states with programs provided hospital care. But
only 12 provided payments for prescribed drugs or for physicians'
services to hospital inpatients, while only 14 states covered the
costs of nursing home care.40 Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of
the act is that it relies on the states for ratification and support. Our
fears for any program depending on such action have been borne out
by the fact that nearly two years after the act's passage, 22 of the
50 states had not established programs.
41
During the 87th Congress, at least two bills were proposed
which would have increased the personal income tax deduction for
uncompensated medical expenses. Clearly these bills are not a solution
to the problem. Probably most of those in need of assistance do not
pay income tax and thus cannot benefit from such programs. Of those
in need who do pay income tax, the increased deduction will at best
compensate for only a small part of the medical outlays.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE PROGRAM
Ten years ago, Professor Harold Groves of the University of Wis-
consin made a proposal to the President's Commission on the Health
39. 42 U.S.C. § 301-06 (1958).
40. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALT-I, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, THE HEALTH CARE OF THE
AGED, SocIAL SECURrTY ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF PROGRAM RESEARCH 88 (1962).




Needs of the Nation. Unfortunately, his excellent approach has not
received the attention it deserves, for in our opinion his program
for aid to the medically indigent is superior to any yet proposed in
Congress. 42
The proposal would involve primarily an extension of existing tax
laws. Presently, medical expenses exceeding 3 per cent of adjusted
gross income are deductible from the income tax base. This provision
allows only fractional reimbursements to those who pay income taxes,
none for those who do not. Groves' suggestion with which we concur
was to permit the individual to subtract from his tax obligation medi-
cal expenses exceeding a certain fraction of income. Where the al-
lowed deduction is greater than the obligation, or where there is no
obligation, the Government would grant a refund as in the case of an
overpayment of taxes. The plan is completely flexible and could pro-
vide any desired amount of reimbursement up to 100 per cent.43
First priority for government aid should go to those who cannot
meet their bills without assistance. Therefore, this program is not
designed to protect people against everyday medical expenses, but
against catastrophes. To cover the former, the individual would be
free to purchase private insurance and to include the premiums as
part of his medical expenses. Insurance benefits, however, would be
subtracted from the costs eligible as a tax deduction. This feature
would enable the individual to provide privately for his general needs,
government assistance being granted only in case of financial difficul-
ties.
As to details we would suggest that the individual be responsible
for his own medical bills up to an amount equal to 15 per cent of his
adjusted gross income, and for 20 per cent of the costs in excess of
this. The federal government would pay the difference. Making the
recipient responsible for part of the costs would discourage unneeded
expenditures. An example would be as follows: with an adjusted
family income of $1,500, and medical outlays of $500, the individual
would have to pay the first $225 plus 20 per cent of the rest, totaling
in all $280.
Financing would be in the form of a credit against income taxes.
Our estimate of the costs of this program with an initial deduction
42. When we initially approached this problem we were unaware of Professor Grove's
proposal and formulated our own scheme basically identical to his. In the discussion
which follows, we refer to it as "our" plan because of the details in which it differs
from that of Professor Grove's.
43. On September 22, 1961, Representative Johanson introduced a bill which would
have allowed a tax credit up to $100 toward purchase of a "medical care insurance
policy for the elderly." H.R. 9387, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). No payment to an
aged insuree who did not pay income tax was stipulated. Since most aged do not pay
income tax, little relief could be expected from this proposal. We mention this bill
because it is the nearest we have seen to our proposal.
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of 15 per cent and an 80 per cent government contribution is $1.56
billion. One way of making up the loss in tax collections would be to
increase income tax rates in each bracket by 1 per cent. The estimate,
it must be stressed, is a minimum figure based on current consump-
tion patterns. It is quite likely that paying part of the bills of the
poor would increase their use of medical services and similarly the
costs of the program. But any of the proposed plans would have the
same effect. As long as coverage is restricted to the needy this is a
benefit rather than a drawback, for it indicates that the number not
getting sufficient care has been reduced.
A more complicated, but possibly more equitable, program would
be to schedule the rates to vary with income. Table 2 contains such
a hypothetical schedule. We have assumed a 20 per cent co-insurance
feature for all income levels, though this, too, could be varied.
Table 2
SCHEDULE OF DEDUCTIONS AND CO-INSURANCE RATES
AT VARYING INCOMES TO BE USED IN DETERMINING
INCOME TAX CREDITS FOR UNCOMPENSATED
MEDICAL CARE COSTS
Adjusted Gross Income Deduction Rate as Co-Insurance Rate as
a Percentage of Income a Percentage of Income




$8,000 and over 25 20
In Table 3 we show the share of payment between family and
Government at different incomes when the annual family medical bil
is $1,000 in excess of that paid by present insurance. As can be seen,
at very low income levels most of the costs are handled by the
Government, but as the ability to pay increases, the burden is shifted
to the family. Even under the suggested program the family's medical
bills remain relatively heavy. They would be reduced by a smaller
percentage deduction and co-insurance feature, but this, of course,
would call for a larger government outlay. Our suggested programs-
covering all of those in need-would cost approximately the same as




SHARE OF UNCOMPENSATED MEDICAL CARE COSTS
BETWEEN FAMILY AND GOVERNMENT AT DIFFERENT
INCOMES ACCORDING TO SCHEDULE OF TABLE 2
Adjusted Total Annual
Gross Uncompensated Paid by Paid by
Income Deduction Co-Insurance Medical Bills Family Government
$1,000 $ 50 $190 $1,000 $ 240 $760
3,000 300 140 1,000 440 560
5,000 750 50 1,000 800 200
7,000 1,400 - 1,000 1,000
9,000 2,250 - 1,000 1,000
The approach outlined above meets our test of a good program.
All those whose medical bills are high relative to income would
receive government assistance regardless of age, but the Government
would not be called upon to finance those who could afford their
own medical outlays. Whether it was in the future found possible
to liberalize the program or necessary to reduce it, with this approach
priority would always be given to those most in need.
Benefits would cover all the areas of health expenditures-doctors,
hospitals, drugs, insurance, etc. Whatever the source of his bills, the
individual would receive reimbursement if the total costs were above
the prescribed limits. This is advantageous because the source of
medical indigence differs among individuals; some have high hospital
bills, for others expensive drugs use up most of their income.
As we have argued above, financing either from general tax reve-
nues or by increased rates on the income tax is more equitable than
through Social Security. The overall United States tax structure is
not very progressive, and we should be reluctant to reduce this
progressivity by greater reliance upon regressive payroll taxes.
Administration of the program would be simple and could be
carried out through the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Some people
would have to file income tax forms who would not otherwise be
required to do so, but under any plan of assistance, some kind of
report would have to be submitted. A means test is involved, but one
no harder to administer or more degrading than our present deduction
against personal income for medical expenses. The Government would
be no more implicated in the administration of medicine than is the
insurance company today-that is, it would merely seek to prevent
fraud and unreasonable charges. Furthermore, only a minimum of
paper work for the doctor and hospital would be entailed, since it
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would be the responsibility of the individual to deal with the Govern-
ment. Thus, this plan satisfies our criteria for a good program; it
covers the neediest in all age and income groups, provides compre-
hensive benefits, is equitably financed, and is both flexible and in-
expensive to administer.
Another advantage of our plan is its great flexibility. By altering
deduction and co-insurance rates, expenditures under the program
can be controlled as desired. Moreover, as Table 3 shows, although
this scheme would be a substitute for catastrophe plans provided by
some companies, the middle and upper income groups would still
have strong incentives to purchase health insurance, so the major
market of the private insurance companies would not be damaged.
With the financial problems of the low income, poor risk patients
solved, insurance companies would be relieved of their major head-
ache.
VI. CONCLUSION
Professor Milton Friedman of the University of Chicago once said:
"You cannot save lives, only prolong them." While saving lives is
beyond our capacity, the skills learned and the tools discovered in the
last hundred years have enabled us to double life expectancy. Unfor-
tunately, the funds necessary to purchase the benefits of modem
medicine are often beyond the financial capacity of the poor. Today
few in our society would deny the right of the individual to the
medical attention he requires. And yet a minority of our population
are not getting sufficient care, while others get it, but go bankrupt in
the process. Probably remedial legislation will be passed in the
current session of Congress. Let us hope that the action taken will
not leave large areas of the problem still unsolved.
